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This paper examines the market reaction to stock splits announcements during the period 
2003 to 2013. We find a significantly positive Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) 
on the announcement day as well as the following day. Both liquidity and signaling reasons 
contribute to this result.  
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The effects of stock split on stock price and return has been attracting financial scholars‟ 
attention for a long time. Much research has been made with regards to this topic. Stock splits 
often take place after an increase in stock prices and are usually followed by positive 
abnormal return upon announcement. Theoretically, stock split should not be associated with 
a positive market reaction since it is only a cosmetic change between price and share 
outstanding that should not increase the firm‟s value.  
 
In this paper, we will discuss the positive market reaction to stock split and the possible 
contributing reasons to this phenomenon specifically for the period from 2003 to 2013. First 
of all, we show that the split announcement is followed by a positive abnormal return. We 
then present two possible hypotheses that can explain the positive reaction to the split. These 
hypotheses are liquidity hypothesis and signaling hypothesis. Cross-section regression will be 






2. Literature review 
 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) and Johnson (1966) observed the existence of 
abnormal return (AR) around stock split declaration. For the Canadian market, Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (1991, 1993) also discovered a positive split declaration effect in the market for 
the 1978–1987 period. To analyze the underlying reason that attribute to the positive market 
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reaction, several hypotheses have been suggested. Though the liquidity and signaling 
hypothesis are commonly discussed in the context of stock splits, in this paper we review also 
other hypotheses including: the neglected firm, the trading range, the tick size, the 
self-selection, and the dividend hypotheses. All of these other hypotheses are somewhat 
related to either liquidity, signaling or both – so our empirical analysis focuses only on the 
two main hypothesis: liquidity and signaling.  
 
2.1 Liquidity hypothesis 
Liquidity measures the ability to turn assets into cash quickly. The main idea of the liquidity 
hypothesis is that following a split more investors are able to buy the stock, which in turn 
increases the trading volume and liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) predicted that 
there is a positive relationship between the value of equity and liquidity, which suggests that 
after a stock split, when liquidity increases, equity value increases. A decade later，Muscarella 
and Vetsuypens (1996) confirmed these predictions.  
Conversely, Conroy, Harris, and Benet‟s (1990) findings were conflicted with the liquidity 
hypothesis by observing an increase in the percentage bid-ask spreads after a stock split. 
Similarly, the evidence from Copeland‟s study that examine liquidity measured by the bid-ask 
spread or volume and turnover metrics does not support the liquidity improvement hypothesis 
either (Copeland (1979)). 
 
2.2 Signaling hypothesis 
Brennan and Copeland (1988), McNichols and Dravid (1990), and Brennan and 
Hughes (1991), interpreted the positive stock market reaction to split announcements as a 
result of a signal of firm‟s favorable inside information to investors. The positive market 
reaction for stock splits suggests that splits convey positive information to investors about the 
future profitability of the firm. For example, the market reaction to two-for-one splits is 
3.38%, which is higher for smaller firms where conceivably more opportunities for 
mispricing might exist.. In addition, the market reaction is higher for firms that split to 
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relatively low stock prices. Asquith et al. (1989) also came to similar conclusion about the 
signaling effect of stock split. This hypothesis makes sense since there are filing costs and 
transaction costs associated with stock split, thus firms tend not to announce a stock split 
when their stock prices tend to fall due to the associated high costs.  
 
Arbel and Swanson (1993) tested 103 „„pure‟‟ split announcements to investigate the different 
effect of stock split announcement for stocks with different level of information asymmetry 
during the 1984–1987 period. „One proxy for information asymmetry is the number of 
analysts making annual estimates of firm earnings‟ (Arbel and Swanson 1993). They found 
that the market reaction to stock split is stronger for stocks with high information asymmetry 
than that with low information asymmetry.  
 
2.3 The neglected-firm hypothesis 
The neglected-firm hypothesis means that management use stock split to draw investors‟ 
attention on the firm to gain more recognition. This hypothesis is hard to separate from the 
liquidity and signaling hypothesis because by definition if a firm is neglected then it is 
probably associated with low liquidity and high information asymmetry. Arbel and Swanson 
(1993) proposed this hypothesis predominantly by observing that management tend to declare 
stock split for the companies that are hardly known which are defined as companies that have 
a high level of information asymmetry.  
 
2.4 Trading range hypothesis 
Trading range hypothesis is based on the idea that it is good to keep the stock price within a 
trading range as that can expand its investor base, optimally balance the amount of retail and 
institutional clients, and result in a positive market reaction. This again, can be seen as an 
extension of the liquidity hypothesis, however, here the idea is that the benefits from 
increased liquidity is dependent on a particular attribute of a price range. “As the share price 
overflows this trading range, the trading cost, price stability, and the liquidity of the stock 
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change, so the marketability of the stock can be deteriorated” （Juan C. Reboredo, 2003）. 
Under this hypothesis, management will announce a stock split to bring the stock price back 
when it breaks beyond the trading range.  
 
2.5 Optimal tick size hypothesis 
„Tick size‟ means the minimum price movement of a trading instrument. For example, if the 
minimum price movement of a stock is 0.01; the stock has a tick value of one cent, that is to say, 
each tick is worth one cent for one stock. 
Optimal tick size hypothesis emphasizes on the fact that relative tick size would increase as a 
result of stock price decrease following the stock split. This, similar to the trading range 
hypothesis, is an extension or a particular case of the liquidity hypothesis. Baker and 
Gallagher (1980), Baker and Powell (1993), Angel (1994) found that large relative tick size 
could improve the liquidity effect by several reasons. Firstly, larger tick size can embrace a 
higher minimum floor on the bid-ask spread and this can appeal more to investors Angel 
(1994). Secondly, transaction can be reduced with larger tick size Angel (1994). Furthermore, 
Anshuman and Kalay (1994) found that larger tick size can prompt dealers to aggregate their 
orders.  
 
Angel (1997) introduced this idea of optimal tick size hypothesis by thinking that managers 
undertake stock split with the intention of bringing the relative tick size back to a preset 
optimal level. By having a wider tick size, bargaining and processing costs would be lower 
while more limit orders would be motivated and thus the trading volume would increase 
accordingly. However, a wider tick size increases the cost to investors inherent in a wider 
percentage spread simultaneously. Therefore, a cost trade-off exists here for the company to 
find the optional tick size relative to its stock price. Though this hypothesis was reasonable 
during the 90‟s, it is irrelvant in current situation since quotes are in decimal instead of quoted 
in 1/16 now. 
 
11 
2.6 Self-selection hypothesis 
Ikenberry et al. (1996) came up with a self-selection hypothesis, which can be regarded as a 
combination of the signaling and trading range hypotheses. According to this hypothesis, 
management announces splits at an aim to bring the stock price back to a certain range. 
However, this split has to account for management‟s expectation on the firm‟s future positive 
performance, which the market learns through the split signal. Because of this signaling effect, 
managers choose a lower after event target price if they want to bring the stock prices back to 
the trading range previous set. These authors found that the post-split target prices, which 
were previously set, are negatively correlated with the market reaction to stock split, which is 
consistent with this hypothesis.  
 
2.7 The dividend hypothesis 
Copeland (1979) interpreted the split declaration as a signal of a future dividend increase. 
That is to say, the positive abnormal return is not due to the stock split but results of the 
dividend increases or decreases that followed or preceded this stock split. This hypothesis can 
be seen as an particular case of the signaling hypothesis. „„Higher dividends provide investors 
with signals of management‟s increased confidence in their companies‟ future levels of 
profitability and cash flows. Thus, it is not stock splits per se that cause higher stock prices, 
but rather management‟s emphatic statements of continued confidence in the company‟s 
future performance conveyed to the market in the form of larger than expected dividend 






3. Data and methodology 
 
The initial sample of our research came from the entire database of EVENTUS. We 
investigated the abnormal return surrounding the stock split announcement date for 
the period from 2003 to 2013 for a total number of 2591 splits. Then we partitioned 
this database into three periods, respectively. The pre crisis period from 2004 to 2006, 
the crisis period from 2007 to 2010 and the post crisis period from 2011 to 2013. 
Afterwards, we checked for the market efficiency in incorporating the announcement 
effect by analyzing the AAR for several days after the announcement date. The 
sample included 1216 stock splits for the pre crisis period, 825 splits for the crisis 
period and 550 splits for the post period. For each stock split, we input the PERMNO 
of split company and the split year into EVENTUS. Then the EVENTUS output the 
daily stock returns for 60 days surrounding the split declaration date (from t = -30 to t 
= +30) as well as some other information related to the stock split. (see Appendix 
table1) 
 
Besides, we generated the associated data of stock price, trading volume, research and 
development expense (R & D expense), value of assets, i.sic2 (a dummy variable for 
industry), and i.year (a dummy variable for split year). The R & D expense is collected 
from Compustat database. Trading volume is collecting by taking average of the 
firm‟s trading volume one month prior of the split announcement date. I.sic2 takes the 
first two number of sic code and this represents the industry that a company is in. 
I.year is just the year that stock split happened. 
 
We obtained the measure of illiquidity by multiplying price by trading volume then 
divide the result by 1000 to get it in $ and then ranked them from the highest to the 
lowest.  We define the variable Illiquidity as a dummy variable that equals one if 
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volume is below the median in the sample, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we obtained 
the normalized R&D expense by dividing the R&D expense by total assets and 
generating a variable High information asymmetry if normalized R&D expense is 
above the median in the sample, and zero otherwise. The following table 1 is the basic 
statistics of previous data. 
 
Table 1 Basic statistics of the inputs  
Normalized R&D is the measured in percentage, and Liquidity is measured in million dollar. 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum 
Normalized 
R&D 
0.00966 0.4761 0 
Liquidity 827.60 19126.21 0.142011 




4. Empirical results 
 
From EVENTUS output, we can observe the existence of positive mean abnormal 
return (AAR) on the stock split announcement day and the next day as well as the 
entire month ahead of the announcement date for all 2591 stock splits at 99.9% 
significance level. The reason for such high AAR ahead of stock split is that many 
firms split their stocks when there is an increase in their stock prices. Moreover, 
before the announcement, some insiders may know about the split announcement 
ahead of time, so there may be some inside trades which bring up the stock prices. It 
can be observed from the table 2 below that the AAR on the announcement day and 
the following day is highest, with a value of 1.93%. 
 
Table 2: Average abnormal return around stock split announcement 









(-30,-1) 2591 1.13% 0.93% 1402:1189>>> 5.249*** 3.821*** 6.680*** 
(0,+1) 2591 1.93% 1.55% 1787:804>>> 33.792*** 25.309*** 21.825*** 
(+2,+30) 2591 -0.33% 0.18% 1290:1301> 1.057 -1.134 2.274 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction 
and significance of the generalized sign test. The Patell Z test is an example of a standardized abnormal 
return approach, which estimates a separate standard error for each security-event and assumes 
cross-sectional independence. The generalized sign test adjusts for the fraction of positive abnormal 
returns in the estimation period instead of assuming 0.5.The CDA is the time-series standard deviation 
test. The standard error for this test is computed from the time series of portfolio mean abnormal 
returns during the estimation period. 
 
To look into the significance of AAR for each day surrounding the stock split 
announcement date, we provide the abnormal return during t = -7 to t = 7 (the split 
announcement day is assumed to be t = 0). The result is shown in Table3. It can be 
seen that average abnormal return is significant for the total 2591 splits from t = 0 to t 
= 3 at the significance level of 99.9%.  
 
 
Table 3: Abnormal return for each day  
Eventus (R) Software from Cowan Research, L.C. 











-7 2591 0.08% 1292:1299> 1.472 1.503 2.353* 
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-6 2591 0.02% 1241:1350 0.122 0.324 0.346 
-5 2591 0.00% 1204:1387 0.807 -0.08 -1.109 
-4 2591 0.13% 1236:1355 2.577** 2.354* 0.15 
-3 2591 0.01% 1255:1336 0.929 0.122 0.897 
-2 2591 0.01% 1248:1343 0.139 0.235 0.622 
-1 2591 0.12% 1280:1311) 3.231** 2.184* 1.881$ 
0 2591 0.86% 1538:1053>>> 22.183*** 15.944*** 12.030*** 
1 2591 1.07% 1626:965>>> 25.605*** 19.848*** 15.492*** 
2 2591 0.32% 1365:1226>>> 8.359*** 5.875*** 5.224*** 
3 2591 0.23% 1342:1249>>> 4.832*** 4.192*** 4.320*** 
4 2591 0.15% 1309:1282>> 3.789*** 2.771** 3.021** 
5 2591 0.10% 1291:1300> 3.128** 1.837$ 2.313* 
6 2591 0.10% 1290:1301> 2.213* 1.878$ 2.274* 
7 2591 0.10% 1285:1306> 2.936** 1.940$ 2.077* 
 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction 
and significance of the generalized sign test. 
 
Further, we tried to figure out if the 2008 crisis has any influence on the AAR 
occurred surrounding stock splits. Thus we divided the period from 2003 to 2013 into 
three sub-periods, the pre-crisis period from 2003 to 2006, the crisis period from 2007 
to 2010 and the post crisis period from 2011 to 2013. Then we tabulated their AAR 
separately.  
 
For the pre-crisis period, we have obtained 1216 stock split events during this period. 
We collected the mean abnormal return (AAR) of these firms surrounding the split 
announcement day from t = -30 to t = +30 (Appendix table1). Surprisingly, the 
abnormal return is significant not only for the announcement day and the next day, but 
16 
also for the following week. It can be seen that from t = 0 to t = 3, there are positive 
abnormal return at 99.9% significance level. In addition, abnormal returns appear 
significant and positive at least at 95% level from t = 4 to t = 7. For the crisis period, 
the AAR is calculated by averaging the 825 split‟s abnormal return on equally 
weighted basis. The abnormal return result shows positive AAR on both the 
announcement day and the day after (Appendix table2). We found that there was a 
total number of 550 stock split happened during the post split period. We applied 
these data to EVENTUS to achieve that the abnormal return is positive and significant 
on the split declaration day as well as the next day at a significance level of 99.9% 
(Appendix table 3).  In what follows we use CAAR of t=0 till t=1, as that is justified 




5. Results from regression analysis 
Table 4: Analysis of liquidity and signaling hypothesis  
H is the dummy variable for High-tech companies. I is the dummy variable for illiquidity of the stock. 
CAAR01 is the Cumulative average abnormal return of announcement and the day after. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CAAR01 CAAR01 CAAR01 
    
H 0.0109*** 0.0118*** 0.0112** 
 (0.00319) (0.00451) (0.00565) 
I 0.0125*** 0.0134*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.00319) (0.00451) (0.00513) 
Interaction  -0.00186 -0.000954 
  (0.00638) (0.00696) 
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Constant 0.00942*** 0.00893*** 0.134*** 
 (0.00281) (0.00327) (0.0454) 
    
Industry and year 
fixed effects 
  Yes 
    
Observations 800 800 800 
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.131 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To study the hypotheses that promote such positive market reaction, we employed 
STATA to do a cross-sectional regression model of cumulative abnormal return 
(CAAR) versus several variables in three scenarios. The result of the three regressions 
is exhibited in the above Table 4. 
 
When we use only H and I as independent variable, we obtained the result that both 
coefficients of the two variables are positive at a significance level of 99%. High 
R&D expense firms are associated with 1.09% increased market reaction compared to 
low R&D firms; and low volume firms (low liquidity) are associated with 1.25% 
increased market reaction compared to high liquid stocks. This demonstrates that both 
liquidity and signaling hypotheses are equally important in magnitude.   
 
We next run the regression of CAAR against I (illiquidity measure), H (information 
asymmetry measure) and the interaction of the two measures. It can be seen from the 
following result (specification (2)) that both the coefficients of I and H are positive 
and significant at 99% level as the previous regression. The coefficient of interaction 
is negative but insignificant, suggesting that there is minimal interaction between the 
two – and the two hypotheses are only partially overlapping. Meanwhile, the previous 
results concerning liquidly and information asymmetry are unchanged compared to 
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specification (1). This confirms that signaling and liquidity have a similar effect on 
the positive reaction to splits.  
 
In the third specification, we regressed CAAR against H, I, i.sic2, i.year as well as the 
interaction of H & I. The regression result is similar to that of the previous two cases. 
It can be seen from the output table that the coefficient of H is positive and significant 
at 95%. Though the significance level is lower than that of the previous two scenarios, 
this tells us that the signaling hypothesis plays a role in explaining the abnormal 
return surrounding the stock split announcement date and the higher the level of 
information asymmetry the higher the abnormal return. In this case, liquidity 
hypothesis continue to be a significant reason in explaining the existence of abnormal 
return at a significance level of 99% just as before. In addition, the dummy variable of 
i.sic has negative coefficients and illustrates different level of significance in 
explaining the dependent variable CAAR. Conversely, the dummy variable of split 
year does not have significant coefficients in most cases.  
 
 
6. Comparison of regression results 
 
Table 5 below demonstrates the significance of each variable that potentially 
contribute to AAR surrounding the split announcement date for each of the three 
models we constructed. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of regression results  
Regression 
     model 
Factor  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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i.sic2 N/A N/A Negative & 90% 
significant 
I,year N/A N/A Mostly Negative & 
insignificant 
H Positive & 99% 
significant 
Positive & 99% 
significant 
Positive & 95% 
significant 
I Positive & 99% 
significant 
Positive & 99% 
significant 
Positive & 99% 
significant 
 
It can be concluded from the regression analysis that liquidity and signaling 
hypothesis contribute to explaining the existence of AAR although the significance 
level may varies. Furthermore, the interaction of the liquidity measure and the 
information asymmetry measure does not have a significant role in explaining the 
change of CAAR.  
 
 
7. Results from robust check 
 
As a robustness check, we use the trading volume (in number of trades) as an 
approximate measure for illiquidity. We then created and illiquidity indicators that 
equals 1 if volume is below median, and one otherwise. For the information 
asymmetry proxy, we refer to master list of SIC codes to distinguish the high-tech 
companies from the low-tech ones. The first regression was run with H and I as the 
only independent variables. The second regression also includes their interaction. The 
last regression was achieved by regressing CAAR against H, I, interaction of H&I, 
i.year, and i.sic2. The regression results of this robust check are displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 6: Robustness check for regression  
H is the dummy variable for High-tech companies. I is the dummy variable for illiquidity of the stock. 
CAAR01 is the Cumulative average abnormal return of announcement and the day after. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CAAR01 CAAR01 CAAR01 
    
H 0.00641* 0.00306 0.0302*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00450) (0.0109) 
I 0.0175*** 0.0147*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00412) (0.00501) 
Interaction  0.00739 0.00136 
  (0.00669) (0.00729) 
 
Industry and year 
fixed effects 
  Yes 
 
 
Constant 0.00986*** 0.0115*** 0.146*** 
 (0.00278) (0.00315) (0.0444) 
    
Observations 800 800 800 
R-squared 0.036 0.037 0.152 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The significance and value of coefficient are somewhat different in Table 6 compared 
to Table 5. According to this specification, Illiquidity is economically more significant 
than before (1.75% compared to 1.25%) but information asymmetry is less significant 
(0.64% compared to 1.09%). Obviously this could be because the proxy for 
information asymmetry has much changed. However, the conclusion that liquidity and 
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signaling hypotheses contribute to the abnormal return remain unchanged.  
 
In the second specification, we can see that the liquidity hypothesis (I) helps explain 
the abnormal return at a significance level of 99% and there is a positive relationship 
between illiquidity and CAAR. Meanwhile, signaling hypothesis does not play a 
significant role here although the information asymmetry measure (H) has a positive 
coefficient. 
 
In the last regression analysis, both H and I have a significant positive coefficient at a 
level of 99%. There is significant negative relationship between CAAR and i.sic2 at a 
significance level of 90%. But the relationship between CAAR nad i.year is not 
significant. Besides, the constant is positive at a significance level of 99%. We 
observed that the robust check results approximately coincide with what we have 
achieved from our previous regression analysis. This makes our empirical results 







We analyze the abnormal return of a sample of 2591 stock split announcements that 
occurred during the period from 2003 to 2013. Our research finds the existence of 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns around stock split announcements 
days, especially for t=0 and t=1. These announcement effects are so significant that 
they cannot be neglected. 
 
To analyze the underlying reason that contributes to such positive market reaction, we 
apply cross-sectional regressions. We find that both  signaling and liquidity play a 
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role. Firstly, we find the measures of signaling and liquidity  are associated with the 
market reaction. Then we run regression of CAAR against these two measures and 
find support for both the two hypotheses since both the measures have a significantly 
positive value. Afterwards, we add the interaction of H & I as the third independent 
variable and obtain that the results are unchanged. Afterwards, we add two dummy 
variables of i.sic2 and i.year to our regression model. Similar results turn out as both 
hypotheses are confirmed.  
 
To prove our findings further, we did a robust check by applying some approximate 
measures for illiquidity and information asymmetry. We achieved similar results since 
the liquidity hypothesis is a key explanation of abnormal return at 99% significance 
level. But the signaling hypothesis doesn‟t seem to be so significant as that of our 
previous regression result. This could potentially be because that liquidity proxies are 







Eventus (R) Software from Cowan Research, L.C. 
(2003-2006) 
  Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 










-30 1625 0.0006 803:822) 0.661 0.977 1.725$ 
-29 1625 0.0005 790:835 1.483 0.785 1.079 
-28 1625 -0.0004 776:849 -0.449 -0.689 0.384 
-27 1623 -0.0003 769:854 -0.571 -0.53 0.083 
-26 1625 0.0002 786:839 0.138 0.293 0.881 
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-25 1625 0.0003 784:841 1.062 0.559 0.781 
-24 1625 0.0005 774:851 0.528 0.766 0.284 
-23 1625 0.0021 768:857    2.218* 3.289*** -0.014 
-22 1625 -0.0002 772:853 0.992 -0.311 0.185 
-21 1625 -0.0007 762:863 -0.916 -1.091 -0.312 
-20 1625 0.0009 806:819)    2.278* 1.513 1.874$ 
-19 1625 0.0005 770:855   1.766$ 0.77 0.086 
-18 1625 0.0004 778:847 1.264 0.62 0.483 
-17 1625 -0.0001 754:871 -0.427 -0.091 -0.709 
-16 1624 -0.0001 747:877 -0.314 -0.094 -1.034 
-15 1625 0.0012 822:803>>    2.165* 1.990* 2.669** 
-14 1624 0.0007 779:845 1.316 1.063 0.556 
-13 1624 0.0006 779:845 1.162 0.987 0.556 
-12 1625 0.001 781:844   1.661$ 1.6 0.632 
-11 1625 0.0003 775:850 0.182 0.418 0.334 
-10 1625 -0.0005 767:858 -0.301 -0.739 -0.064 
-9 1625 -0.0001 777:848 0.355 -0.092 0.433 
-8 1625 -0.0005 770:855 -0.806 -0.858 0.086 
-7 1625 0.0004 801:824 0.433 0.59 1.626 
-6 1625 0.0006 794:831 0.958 0.893 1.278 
-5 1625 0 751:874 0.235 0.066 -0.859 
-4 1625 0.0014 782:843 1.476 2.225* 0.682 
-3 1625 0.0012 790:835    2.517* 1.874$ 1.079 
-2 1625 0.0003 775:850 0.82 0.548 0.334 
-1 1625 0.0016 810:815> 3.166** 2.537* 2.073* 
0 1625 0.0096 991:634>>> 19.739*** 15.387*** 11.067*** 
1 1625 0.0118 1051:574>>> 22.928*** 18.913*** 14.048*** 
2 1625 0.0044 873:752>>> 9.360*** 7.002*** 5.203*** 
3 1625 0.0023 859:766>>> 4.832*** 3.726*** 4.508*** 
4 1625 0.0014 839:786>>> 3.805*** 2.275* 3.514*** 
5 1625 0.0023 830:795>> 4.871*** 3.660*** 3.067** 
6 1625 0.0016 852:773>>> 3.663*** 2.574* 4.160*** 
7 1625 0.0013 819:806> 3.046** 2.113* 2.520* 
8 1625 0 818:807> 1.624 0.016 2.471* 
9 1625 0.0002 805:820) 1.267 0.274 1.825$ 
10 1625 0 773:852 0.165 -0.001 0.235 
11 1625 -0.0015 750:875 -1.787$ -2.444* -0.908 
12 1625 -0.0008 785:840 -1.348 -1.227 0.831 
13 1625 -0.0002 783:842 0.227 -0.318 0.731 
14 1625 0.0004 789:836 1.694$ 0.705 1.03 
15 1625 -0.0002 774:851 -0.057 -0.299 0.284 
16 1625 -0.0011 755:870 -1.707$ -1.828$ -0.66 
17 1625 -0.0003 757:868 -0.614 -0.482 -0.56 
18 1625 -0.0008 766:859 -0.47 -1.277 -0.113 
24 
19 1625 -0.0003 771:854 -0.51 -0.461 0.135 
20 1625 -0.0009 761:864 -1.613 -1.46 -0.362 
21 1625 0.0009 790:835 0.295 1.416 1.079 
22 1625 -0.0001 754:871 0.994 -0.201 -0.709 
23 1625 -0.0018 730:895( -3.116** -2.859** -1.902$ 
24 1625 0.0003 797:828 -0.234 0.456 1.427 
25 1625 -0.0009 755:870 -0.895 -1.463 -0.66 
26 1623 -0.0004 802:821) -0.5 -0.588 1.724$ 
27 1625 -0.0003 765:860 0.506 -0.498 -0.163 
28 1625 -0.0009 727:898< -1.277 -1.447 -2.051* 
29 1625 -0.001 752:873 -1.571 -1.569 -0.809 
30 1625 -0.0012 736:889 -1.613 -1.953$ -1.604 
 
Table 2 
Eventus (R) Software from Cowan Research, L.C.  
(2007-2010) 
  Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 










-30 595 0.0006 281:314 -0.832 0.523 -0.393 
-29 595 0.001 277:318 0.019 0.897 -0.721 
-28 595 0.0002 310:285> 0.438 0.173 1.987* 
-27 595 -0.0005 280:315 -0.485 -0.406 -0.475 
-26 595 0.0031 303:292 0.777 2.714** 1.413 
-25 595 -0.0013 284:311 0.494 -1.165 -0.146 
-24 595 0.0019 290:305 1.434 1.649$ 0.346 
-23 595 0.0014 290:305 0.768 1.249 0.346 
-22 595 0.0004 275:320 -1.242 0.341 -0.885 
-21 595 -0.0011 298:297 -0.499 -0.938 1.002 
-20 595 0.0014 284:311 0.362 1.226 -0.146 
-19 595 -0.0011 280:315 -0.784 -0.952 -0.475 
-18 595 0.002 299:296 1.146 1.711$ 1.084 
-17 595 -0.0009 286:309 -0.46 -0.75 0.018 
-16 595 0.0013 298:297 1.466 1.095 1.002 
-15 595 -0.0002 279:316 -0.99 -0.131 -0.557 
-14 595 -0.0004 283:312 -0.015 -0.323 -0.229 
-13 595 0.0047 326:269>>> 5.116*** 4.063*** 3.300*** 
-12 595 -0.0011 296:299 0.729 -0.981 0.838 
-11 595 0.0023 309:286) 1.412 2.045* 1.905$ 
-10 595 0.0011 302:293 1.251 0.983 1.331 
-9 595 0 297:298 0.957 0.002 0.92 
-8 595 -0.0001 298:297 0.833 -0.072 1.002 
25 
-7 595 0.003 325:270>> 2.490* 2.597** 3.218** 
-6 595 -0.0008 279:316 -1.248 -0.668 -0.557 
-5 595 -0.0001 288:307 1.850$ -0.124 0.182 
-4 595 0.0028 298:297 3.013** 2.417* 1.002 
-3 595 -0.0017 287:308 -1.45 -1.447 0.1 
-2 595 0.0001 299:296 -0.53 0.075 1.084 
-1 595 0.0014 303:292 1.656$ 1.231 1.413 
0 595 0.0082 335:260>>> 9.033*** 7.171*** 4.038*** 
1 595 0.0089 356:239>>> 9.329*** 7.775*** 5.762*** 
2 595 0.0019 302:293 1.281 1.648$ 1.331 
3 595 0.0019 300:295 0.738 1.656$ 1.166 
4 595 0.0015 285:310 0.769 1.35 -0.064 
5 595 -0.0012 289:306 -0.52 -1.084 0.264 
6 595 -0.0004 265:330( -0.646 -0.388 -1.706$ 
7 595 -0.0004 284:311 0.095 -0.338 -0.146 
8 595 0.001 301:294 2.193* 0.906 1.248 
9 594 -0.0009 280:314 -0.565 -0.778 -0.436 
10 595 0.0006 295:300 0.603 0.546 0.756 
11 595 -0.0012 288:307 -1.346 -1.089 0.182 
12 595 -0.0001 273:322 -0.342 -0.056 -1.049 
13 595 0.0005 308:287) 1.32 0.469 1.823$ 
14 595 -0.0015 272:323 -1.525 -1.278 -1.131 
15 595 0.0009 284:311 -0.124 0.785 -0.146 
16 595 -0.003 248:347<< -3.690*** -2.621** -3.100** 
17 595 -0.0009 289:306 0.011 -0.787 0.264 
18 595 0.0001 295:300 -0.109 0.129 0.756 
19 595 -0.0025 264:331( -2.505* -2.187* -1.788$ 
20 595 -0.0023 279:316 -1.54 -1.995* -0.557 
21 595 -0.0008 290:305 -1.775$ -0.713 0.346 
22 594 0.0007 303:291 2.032* 0.587 1.453 
23 595 -0.0022 268:327 -2.176* -1.886$ -1.459 
24 595 -0.0029 272:323 -3.064** -2.567* -1.131 
25 594 -0.0028 273:321 -2.768** -2.486* -1.011 
26 595 0 260:335< -0.225 -0.036 -2.116* 
27 595 -0.0048 272:323 -3.832*** -4.157*** -1.131 
28 595 -0.0002 272:323 -0.648 -0.141 -1.131 
29 594 -0.0017 281:313 -1.408 -1.488 -0.354 
30 595 -0.0003 286:309 -1.506 -0.297 0.018 
 
Table 3 




Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 










-30 371 -0.0004 177:194 -0.729 -0.258 -0.88 
-29 371 0.001 179:192 0.554 0.69 -0.672 
-28 371 0.0017 197:174 1.077 1.194 1.197 
-27 371 0.0006 186:185 0.693 0.401 0.055 
-26 371 0.0014 206:165> 2.269* 1.006 2.131* 
-25 371 0.0001 174:197 0.229 0.095 -1.191 
-24 371 0.0007 187:184 0.284 0.473 0.159 
-23 371 0.0026 202:169) 0.818 1.828$ 1.716$ 
-22 371 -0.0008 182:189 0.003 -0.569 -0.361 
-21 371 0.0014 175:196 1.648$ 0.99 -1.087 
-20 371 0 180:191 0.278 -0.008 -0.568 
-19 371 0.0023 196:175 2.288* 1.606 1.093 
-18 371 0.0013 187:184 0.893 0.933 0.159 
-17 371 0.0009 193:178 1.946$ 0.632 0.782 
-16 371 0.0007 189:182 0.383 0.514 0.366 
-15 371 0.0012 190:181 1.193 0.823 0.47 
-14 371 0.0003 173:198 0.994 0.222 -1.295 
-13 371 0.0024 179:192 0.702 1.689$ -0.672 
-12 371 0.0002 191:180 0.426 0.152 0.574 
-11 371 0 185:186 0.375 -0.022 -0.049 
-10 371 0.0008 190:181 0.965 0.569 0.47 
-9 371 0.0001 191:180 0.505 0.086 0.574 
-8 371 0.0011 201:170 0.419 0.747 1.612 
-7 371 0.0001 190:181 0.685 0.104 0.47 
-6 371 0.0015 183:188 0.771 1.051 -0.257 
-5 371 0.0006 178:193 0.017 0.432 -0.776 
-4 371 -0.0014 169:202( 0.126 -1.012 -1.710$ 
-3 371 -0.0009 190:181 -0.067 -0.649 0.47 
-2 371 0.0002 186:185 0.642 0.126 0.055 
-1 371 -0.0005 180:191 0.222 -0.342 -0.568 
0 371 0.0051 216:155>> 5.871*** 3.605*** 3.170** 
1 371 0.0096 221:150>>> 8.203*** 6.738*** 3.689*** 
2 371 0.0006 203:168) 1.639 0.418 1.820$ 
3 371 0.0032 189:182 2.286* 2.286* 0.366 
4 371 0.0024 191:180 1.402 1.669$ 0.574 
5 371 0 188:183 -0.045 0.012 0.262 
6 371 0.0013 180:191 -0.674 0.888 -0.568 
7 371 0.0031 188:183 1.917$ 2.171* 0.262 
8 371 0.0088 175:196 8.901*** 6.191*** -1.087 
9 371 -0.004 177:194 -3.417*** -2.788** -0.88 
10 371 -0.0011 166:205< -0.806 -0.789 -2.022* 
27 
11 371 0.0004 192:179 1.407 0.316 0.678 
12 371 0.0012 190:181 1.035 0.855 0.47 
13 371 -0.0007 188:183 -0.647 -0.487 0.262 
14 371 -0.0007 177:194 -0.024 -0.497 -0.88 
15 371 -0.0002 195:176 0.596 -0.159 0.989 
16 371 0.0003 181:190 -0.394 0.232 -0.464 
17 370 0.0029 197:173 2.115* 2.069* 1.251 
18 370 0.0019 188:182 1.599 1.32 0.315 
19 369 0.0012 176:193 -0.188 0.866 -0.882 
20 369 -0.0016 158:211<< -2.234* -1.116 -2.756** 
21 369 -0.0009 187:182 -0.412 -0.601 0.263 
22 368 -0.0002 181:187 -0.844 -0.166 -0.31 
23 368 0.0019 192:176 2.151* 1.344 0.837 
24 368 0.0004 184:184 0.346 0.277 0.003 
25 368 0.0004 185:183 0.32 0.295 0.107 
26 368 -0.0019 173:195 -0.75 -1.369 -1.144 
27 367 0.0007 180:187 0.354 0.474 -0.363 
28 367 0.0013 183:184 1.596 0.928 -0.049 
29 367 0.0009 187:180 0.598 0.615 0.368 
30 367 0.0005 171:196 0.603 0.36 -1.302 
 
Table 4: Measurement of Normalized R&D  
The R&D-Prior is the R&D expense of previous year of announcement date. Normalized 










2003 LSTR 0.00 438.457 0.00000 
2011 VGR 1.58 927.768 0.00171 
2003 BVN 0.00 911.508 0.00000 
2006 PAG 0.00 4469.802 0.00000 
2005 CMTL 16.85 382.403 0.04406 
2005 SFG 0.00 12450.7 0.00000 
2010 RES 0.00 887.871 0.00000 
2007 MIDD 4.58 413.647 0.01106 
2006 RES 0.00 474.307 0.00000 
2006 NICE 30.90 784.344 0.03939 
2010 VLY 0.00 14143.83 0.00000 
2004 SONC 0.00 518.633 0.00000 
2004 WCN 0.00 1491.483 0.00000 
2005 HUBG 0.00 444.418 0.00000 
2004 WWW 0.00 639.571 0.00000 
2013 WST 33.20 1671.6 0.01986 
28 
2005 CBL 0.00 6352.322 0.00000 
2003 URBN 0.00 277.996 0.00000 
2007 VGR 7.75 785.289 0.00987 
2003 ORI 0.00 9712.3 0.00000 
2012 PRA 0.00 4876.578 0.00000 
2004 DCI 30.46 1001.609 0.03041 
2005 UGI 0.00 4571.5 0.00000 
2004 SID 8.00 6157 0.00130 
2004 ZLC 0.00 1342.084 0.00000 
2005 PZZA 0.00 350.562 0.00000 
2003 FLIR 26.89 450.423 0.05970 
2008 SQM 0.00 2567.215 0.00000 
2010 OMI 0.00 1822.039 0.00000 
2005 KNX 0.00 483.827 0.00000 
2003 FRED 0.00 345.848 0.00000 
2011 OKS 0.00 8946.676 0.00000 
2003 THO 1.41 608.941 0.00231 
2011 USTR 0.00 1994.882 0.00000 
2004 HE 0.00 9375.122 0.00000 
2005 RESP 29.48 878.446 0.03356 
2005 TTC 0.00 916.737 0.00000 
2006 HTLD 0.00 669.07 0.00000 
2005 HOLX 16.66 279.839 0.05953 
2005 HCC 0.00 7028.8 0.00000 
2011 IIVI 11.81 647.202 0.01824 
2005 ROP 38.70 2522.306 0.01534 
2005 FBP 0.00 19917.65 0.00000 
2004 LSTR 0.00 584.512 0.00000 
2008 PDO 0.00 10.277 0.00000 
2007 CSL 15.09 1988.794 0.00759 
2012 TTC 57.00 935.199 0.06095 
2006 MDU 0.00 4903.474 0.00000 
2010 AOS 31.00 2112 0.01468 
2005 RMD 26.17 774.146 0.03380 
2004 CMC 0.00 1988.046 0.00000 
2004 POOL 0.00 480.866 0.00000 
2006 SONC 0.00 638.018 0.00000 
2005 SM 0.00 1268.747 0.00000 
2007 IEX 24.80 1989.594 0.01246 
2003 CBK 0.00 166.357 0.00000 
2004 SSP 0.00 3424.849 0.00000 
2011 ENB 0.00 34343 0.00000 
2008 GHM 3.58 70.711 0.05064 
2004 MGPI 1.90 187.037 0.01016 
29 
2004 TRMB 67.64 653.978 0.10343 
2004 IRM 0.00 4442.387 0.00000 
2003 NYCB 0.00 23441.34 0.00000 
2010 ODFL 0.00 1239.881 0.00000 
2012 HAE 32.66 911.135 0.03584 
2004 JOSB 0.00 186.511 0.00000 
2004 SUG 0.00 4572.458 0.00000 
2003 CELL 0.00 444.69 0.00000 
2003 EASI 1.80 419.301 0.00429 
2004 WGR 0.00 1837.398 0.00000 
2005 ORI 0.00 11543.2 0.00000 
2012 CPRT 0.00 1155.066 0.00000 
2003 USNA 1.04 65.127 0.01589 
2005 MCRS 27.21 547.228 0.04972 
2005 ZQK 0.00 2158.601 0.00000 
2004 INGR 0.00 2367 0.00000 
2004 MGAM 0.00 217.407 0.00000 
2007 PVA 0.00 2253.461 0.00000 
2007 BWS 0.00 1099.057 0.00000 
2009 CBSH 0.00 18120.19 0.00000 
2010 SHOO 0.00 447.696 0.00000 
2005 RYN 7.30 1839.064 0.00397 
2009 FMER 0.00 10539.9 0.00000 
2004 EV 0.00 743.566 0.00000 
2012 ODFL 0.00 1712.514 0.00000 
2013 ELS 0.00 3391.639 0.00000 
2007 TRMB 105.77 1539.359 0.06871 
2005 EGN 0.00 2618.226 0.00000 
2004 BGG 26.40 1637.153 0.01613 
2006 QSII 6.90 122.247 0.05647 
2011 HMSY 0.00 861.951 0.00000 
2004 HUG 0.00 1881.3 0.00000 
2005 KIM 0.00 5534.636 0.00000 
2008 TWI 1.70 654.782 0.00260 
2007 ATU 9.70 1500.776 0.00646 
2011 SKT 0.00 1621.815 0.00000 
2003 TSCO 0.00 536.209 0.00000 
2005 CELL 0.00 487.824 0.00000 
2005 E 0.00 99295.17 0.00000 
2010 CBSH 0.00 18502.34 0.00000 
2003 HWAY 0.00 140.013 0.00000 
2007 IDXX 53.62 702.179 0.07636 
2005 BRO 0.00 1608.66 0.00000 
2004 MTH 0.00 1265.394 0.00000 
30 
2005 ORLY 0.00 1713.899 0.00000 
2004 JOSB 0.00 186.511 0.00000 
2006 BHE 0.00 1406.12 0.00000 
2005 SMG 34.40 2018.9 0.01704 
2011 SHOO 0.00 639.786 0.00000 
2006 OII 0.00 1242.022 0.00000 
2003 SUG 0.00 4590.938 0.00000 
2006 MFC 0.00 359106 0.00000 
2012 BF.B 0.00 3477 0.00000 
2005 FDS 0.00 347.529 0.00000 
2005 SRZ 0.00 1328.276 0.00000 
2012 TDS 0.00 8623.9 0.00000 
2003 GGP 0.00 9582.897 0.00000 
2008 MCRS 33.89 1003.006 0.03378 
2006 RJF 0.00 11516.65 0.00000 
2013 SHOO 0.00 880.241 0.00000 
2007 HSC 2.85 3905.43 0.00073 
2011 DDD 10.73 462.974 0.02317 
2004 POT 0.00 5126.8 0.00000 
2006 ASNA 0.00 846.86 0.00000 
2005 ZNT 0.00 2717.456 0.00000 
2005 HCBK 0.00 28075.35 0.00000 
2011 CLH 0.00 2085.803 0.00000 
2006 BAM 0.00 40708 0.00000 
2004 CCJ 1.72 4052.104 0.00042 
2013 AOS 51.70 2391.5 0.02162 
2006 FUL 16.21 1478.471 0.01097 
2004 PII 47.07 792.925 0.05936 
2006 MD 0.00 1135.17 0.00000 
2003 BHE 0.00 1038.038 0.00000 
2009 INT 0.00 1741.228 0.00000 
2004 KWK 0.00 888.334 0.00000 
2005 MW 0.00 993.322 0.00000 
2006 KEX 0.00 1271.119 0.00000 
2006 CAJ 0.00 37999.29 0.00000 
2007 JEC 0.00 3389.421 0.00000 
2007 SEIC 139.10 1252.365 0.11107 
2008 BF.B 0.00 3405 0.00000 
2007 DIOD 8.32 706.365 0.01177 
2006 EXP 0.00 888.916 0.00000 
2004 SHFL 4.18 185.292 0.02258 
2009 VLY 0.00 14284.15 0.00000 
2005 HSIC 0.00 2583.12 0.00000 
2006 MTW 26.00 2219.5 0.01171 
31 
2011 QSII 16.55 378.686 0.04369 
2008 CBSH 0.00 17532.45 0.00000 
2007 JACK 0.00 1382.822 0.00000 
2005 TIE 2.90 907.264 0.00320 
2012 RES 0.00 1367.163 0.00000 
2005 EQT 0.00 3342.285 0.00000 
2011 NDSN 23.84 1304.45 0.01827 
2012 DCI 55.29 1730.082 0.03196 
2006 TTI 1.30 1086.19 0.00120 
2005 DNR 0.00 1505.069 0.00000 
2010 HRL 25.40 4053.918 0.00627 
2004 FLIR 30.67 619.445 0.04950 
2007 FMC 98.90 2733.4 0.03618 
2011 SF 0.00 4951.9 0.00000 
2010 JOSB 0.00 556.364 0.00000 
2012 ASNA 0.00 2807.1 0.00000 
2011 CHD 53.70 3117.6 0.01722 
2004 DVA 0.00 2511.959 0.00000 
2006 JLG 24.60 1397.3 0.01761 
2004 NYCB 0.00 24037.83 0.00000 
2006 SCSS 2.22 228.961 0.00969 
2003 HAR 109.90 1703.658 0.06451 
2004 WGO 3.46 394.556 0.00878 
2011 CBSH 0.00 20649.37 0.00000 
2003 JBHT 0.00 1347.071 0.00000 
2004 CRDN 2.11 316.354 0.00667 
2004 TCB 0.00 12340.57 0.00000 
2013 WTR 0.00 5051.817 0.00000 
2005 LNG 0.00 1308.124 0.00000 
2006 XRAY 47.00 2181.35 0.02155 
2005 STZ 0.00 7804.172 0.00000 
2005 KWK 0.00 1243.094 0.00000 
2004 MDC 0.00 2790.044 0.00000 
2003 DF 0.00 6992.536 0.00000 
2005 TTWO 43.26 932.876 0.04637 
2007 FLIR 60.58 1024.316 0.05915 
2013 JAH 88.00 10096.1 0.00872 
2003 ZBRA 29.21 701.611 0.04163 
2005 FAST 0.00 890.035 0.00000 
2004 LM 0.00 7262.981 0.00000 
2004 CALM 0.00 301.559 0.00000 
2006 PPDI 23.37 1481.565 0.01577 
2004 CLF 1.60 1161.1 0.00138 
2009 FMER 0.00 10539.9 0.00000 
32 
2007 KMT 26.10 2606.227 0.01001 
2006 AAUKY 40.00 46483 0.00086 
2006 EZPW 0.00 197.858 0.00000 
2010 FHN 0.00 24698.95 0.00000 
2006 JCOM 7.13 288.16 0.02476 
2013 OGE 0.00 9134.7 0.00000 
2009 FHN 0.00 26068.68 0.00000 
2010 FHN 0.00 24698.95 0.00000 
2007 PBCT 0.00 13554.8 0.00000 
2006 BLGM 0.00 1328.911 0.00000 
2006 MDR 3.30 3594.187 0.00092 
2009 FHN 0.00 26068.68 0.00000 
2005 SWN 0.00 1868.524 0.00000 
2007 COG 0.00 2208.594 0.00000 
2013 TRMB 256.46 3700.84 0.06930 
2005 CHRW 0.00 1395.068 0.00000 
2006 HFC 0.00 1237.869 0.00000 
2011 OII 0.00 2400.544 0.00000 
2005 PENN 0.00 4190.404 0.00000 
2010 FHN 0.00 24698.95 0.00000 
2003 RCII 0.00 1831.302 0.00000 
2003 ECL 49.86 3228.918 0.01544 
2004 HSY 24.50 3797.531 0.00645 
2009 UHS 0.00 3964.463 0.00000 
2008 BKE 0.00 450.657 0.00000 
2011 RYN 0.00 2569.348 0.00000 
2006 DRQ 20.87 594.935 0.03507 
2011 TMK 0.00 17156.39 0.00000 
2011 WEC 0.00 13862.1 0.00000 
2005 JBHT 0.00 1548.874 0.00000 
2004 PDCO 0.00 1588.957 0.00000 
2008 FHN 0.00 31021.98 0.00000 
2006 TRN 0.00 3425.6 0.00000 
2005 PCP 5.00 3625 0.00138 
2006 CMC 0.00 2898.868 0.00000 
2006 UN 0.00 32692.93 0.00000 
2003 JCOM 3.19 112.856 0.02824 
2006 RS 0.00 3614.173 0.00000 
2005 HRS 111.30 2457.4 0.04529 
2005 MCO 0.00 1457.2 0.00000 
2005 PPL 0.00 17926 0.00000 
2013 SAN 0.00 1537238 0.00000 
2004 URBN 0.00 359.595 0.00000 
2005 SPF 0.00 4280.842 0.00000 
33 
2004 RYL 0.00 2424.97 0.00000 
2004 FICO 67.57 1444.779 0.04677 
2004 COCO 0.00 552.993 0.00000 
2005 DGX 0.00 5306.115 0.00000 
2005 HLX 0.00 1660.864 0.00000 
2005 TSM 0.00 15838.71 0.00000 
2009 FHN 0.00 26068.68 0.00000 
2005 RRC 0.00 2018.985 0.00000 
2005 NFX 0.00 5081 0.00000 
2003 JCI 439.00 13127.3 0.03344 
2004 HOV 0.00 3156.267 0.00000 
2005 BOOM 0.00 55.311 0.00000 
2005 PIXR 17.37 1488.74 0.01167 
2010 TEF 0.00 172198.4 0.00000 
2005 NBL 0.00 8878.033 0.00000 
2004 CELG 122.70 1107.293 0.11081 
2005 CHS 0.00 715.729 0.00000 
2007 CRS 10.20 2025.7 0.00504 
2012 FMC 105.20 4373.9 0.02405 
2005 JWN 0.00 4605.39 0.00000 
2013 FISV 0.00 9513 0.00000 
2006 CCJ 2.41 5140.429 0.00047 
2013 FLS 38.90 5036.733 0.00772 
2011 FAST 0.00 1684.948 0.00000 
2004 SYK 180.20 4083.8 0.04413 
2004 CTSH 0.00 572.745 0.00000 
2003 PX 69.00 8305 0.00831 
2006 INTU 305.24 2770.027 0.11019 
2013 TSCO 0.00 1903.391 0.00000 
2003 PHM 0.00 8063.352 0.00000 
2011 PII 84.94 1228.024 0.06917 
2012 OKE 0.00 15855.28 0.00000 
2003 CECO 0.00 1119.15 0.00000 
2011 EMN 152.00 6184 0.02458 
2006 MAR 0.00 8588 0.00000 
2005 NEE 0.00 33004 0.00000 
2010 TSCO 0.00 1463.474 0.00000 
2006 STLD 0.00 2247.017 0.00000 
2006 TROW 0.00 2765.3 0.00000 
2006 HP 0.00 2134.712 0.00000 
2010 DECK 8.11 808.994 0.01003 
2003 SNPS 313.25 2307.353 0.13576 
2004 NOC 429.00 33361 0.01286 
2007 TAP 0.00 13451.57 0.00000 
34 
2007 STR 0.00 5944.2 0.00000 
2004 SCHN 0.00 605.973 0.00000 
2005 MUR 0.00 6368.511 0.00000 
2009 FHN 0.00 26068.68 0.00000 
2004 TSM 0.00 15735.79 0.00000 
2006 EAT 0.00 2221.779 0.00000 
2006 RAI 53.00 18178 0.00292 
2006 TIE 3.20 1216.873 0.00263 
2007 MTW 31.20 2868.7 0.01088 
2003 TSM 0.00 11985.89 0.00000 
2006 TIE 3.20 1216.873 0.00263 
2003 ADTN 56.30 593.9 0.09479 
2003 IGT 77.92 4185.231 0.01862 
2005 MGM 0.00 20699.42 0.00000 
2005 SPLS 0.00 7071.448 0.00000 
2011 CERN 203.86 3000.358 0.06794 
2004 EXC 0.00 42770 0.00000 
2006 PGR 0.00 19482.1 0.00000 
2006 L 0.00 76880.9 0.00000 
2004 KBH 0.00 5835.956 0.00000 
2006 CB 0.00 50277 0.00000 
2013 CERN 219.64 4098.364 0.05359 
2007 PH 166.17 8441.413 0.01969 
2006 QLGC 82.79 937.707 0.08829 
2004 NUE 0.00 6133.207 0.00000 
2006 ITW 127.87 13880.44 0.00921 
2004 DHR 207.00 8493.893 0.02437 
2006 PCAR 117.80 16107.4 0.00731 
2005 ITT 145.10 7063.4 0.02054 
2006 TEX 46.80 4785.9 0.00978 
2013 VFC 0.00 10315.44 0.00000 
2005 CELG 160.85 1246.637 0.12903 
2008 ERIC 0.00 36268.12 0.00000 
2004 DVN 0.00 29736 0.00000 
2005 BZH 0.00 3770.516 0.00000 
2006 EMR 303.00 18672 0.01623 
2007 TXT 351.00 19956 0.01759 
2005 CAM 0.00 3098.562 0.00000 
2006 GD 344.00 22376 0.01537 
2004 STJ 241.08 3230.747 0.07462 
2013 NBL 0.00 19642 0.00000 
2005 EOG 0.00 7753.32 0.00000 
2013 BEN 0.00 15390.3 0.00000 
2003 CTSH 0.00 360.589 0.00000 
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2007 OMC 0.00 19271.7 0.00000 
2005 MHFI 0.00 6395.808 0.00000 
2005 ESRX 0.00 5493 0.00000 
2003 LEN 0.00 6775.432 0.00000 
2008 PEG 0.00 29049 0.00000 
2013 COG 0.00 4981.08 0.00000 
2011 HFC 0.00 10314.62 0.00000 
2007 CMI 321.00 8195 0.03917 
2006 CNX 2.17 5663.332 0.00038 
2005 SBUX 8.30 3514.065 0.00236 
2007 JCI 420.00 24105 0.01742 
2005 PHM 0.00 13048.17 0.00000 
2006 SCCO 0.00 6376.414 0.00000 
2005 WFM 0.00 1889.296 0.00000 
2005 ADBE 311.30 2440.315 0.12756 
2006 M 0.00 33168 0.00000 
2008 ATVI 397.00 14701 0.02700 
2007 MDR 18.70 4411.486 0.00424 
2007 CI 0.00 40065 0.00000 
2005 SWN 0.00 1868.524 0.00000 
2012 TJX 0.00 8281.605 0.00000 
2007 D 0.00 39123 0.00000 
2004 VLO 0.00 19391.6 0.00000 
2007 NKE 0.00 10688.3 0.00000 
2006 CSX 0.00 25129 0.00000 
2008 SWN 0.00 4760.158 0.00000 
2010 DHR 632.65 22217.13 0.02848 
2007 PCAR 163.10 17228.2 0.00947 
2005 CAT 928.00 47069 0.01972 
2006 CX 0.00 29973.43 0.00000 
2010 GIS 208.20 17678.9 0.01178 
2005 UTX 1267.00 45925 0.02759 
2007 ESRX 0.00 5256.4 0.00000 
2010 RIO 193.00 112402 0.00172 
2007 POT 0.00 9716.6 0.00000 
2013 WFM 0.00 5538 0.00000 
2008 HOLX 44.38 8134.632 0.00546 
2004 SYMC 201.97 4456.498 0.04532 
2010 ESRX 0.00 10557.8 0.00000 
2013 DDD 23.20 1097.856 0.02113 
2012 NKE 0.00 15465 0.00000 
2008 CLF 0.00 4111.1 0.00000 
2006 NVDA 348.22 1954.687 0.17815 
2013 CL 259.00 13876 0.01867 
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2006 LOW 0.00 24639 0.00000 
2005 TOL 0.00 6343.84 0.00000 
2006 HES 0.00 22404 0.00000 
2006 NUE 0.00 7884.989 0.00000 
2004 GILD 670.36 2155.963 0.31093 
2003 EA 380.56 2359.533 0.16129 
2004 PG 1665.00 57048 0.02919 
2007 DE 725.80 38575.7 0.01881 
2006 BRCM 724.50 4876.766 0.14856 
2011 CSX 0.00 29473 0.00000 
2004 CVX 228.00 93208 0.00245 
2003 BSX 428.00 5699 0.07510 
2006 WFC 0.00 481996 0.00000 
2007 GILD 2777.91 5834.716 0.47610 
2007 TSO 0.00 8128 0.00000 
2006 SLB 505.51 22832.14 0.02214 
2007 MRO 0.00 42746 0.00000 
2008 UNP 0.00 39722 0.00000 
2011 POT 0.00 16257 0.00000 
2004 SNDK 84.20 2320.18 0.03629 
2006 PD 48.60 14632.3 0.00332 
2005 COP 126.00 106999 0.00118 
2006 HAL 220.00 16820 0.01308 
2004 YHOO 217.81 9178.201 0.02373 
2012 GILD 1229.15 21239.84 0.05787 
2003 EBAY 104.64 5820.134 0.01798 
2012 KO 0.00 86174 0.00000 
2005 VLO 0.00 32728 0.00000 
2011 LARK 0.00 598.24 0.00000 
2005 GCBC 0.00 294.68 0.00000 
2003 SVBF 0.00 431.074 0.00000 
2003 NWFL 0.00 387.483 0.00000 
2003 JFBC 0.00 352.204 0.00000 
2009 KOSS 0.73 29.626 0.02451 
2005 NICH 0.00 10.453 0.00000 
2012 LARK 0.00 614.067 0.00000 
2004 MSL 0.00 610.088 0.00000 
2007 MSL 0.00 854.056 0.00000 
2006 PLCC 0.00 38.464 0.00000 
2005 ESP 0.15 29.696 0.00505 
2003 RMCF 0.00 16.084 0.00000 
2005 HARL 0.00 766.99 0.00000 
2003 HFFC 0.00 800.483 0.00000 
2005 NHTB 0.00 650.179 0.00000 
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2004 ONFC 0.00 422.609 0.00000 
2006 FFKY 0.00 822.826 0.00000 
2005 CASS 0.00 818.698 0.00000 
2003 PXFG 0.32 36.411 0.00865 
2004 UUU 0.29 11.387 0.02503 
2013 LARK 0.00 828.755 0.00000 
2006 TIBB 0.00 1319.093 0.00000 
2011 HBNC 0.00 1547.162 0.00000 
2003 FNBF 0.00 780.926 0.00000 
2004 FNLC 0.00 634.238 0.00000 
2006 ESBK 0.00 371.42 0.00000 
2005 WBCO 0.00 725.976 0.00000 
2005 PULB 0.00 789.861 0.00000 
2004 UNTY 0.00 515.417 0.00000 
2006 UNTY 0.00 694.106 0.00000 
2004 PVFC 0.00 755.687 0.00000 
2006 COOPQ 0.00 860.09 0.00000 
2006 CCFH 0.00 425.886 0.00000 
2004 LWAY 0.00 19.688 0.00000 
2004 RMCF 0.00 17.967 0.00000 
2006 NKSH 0.00 868.203 0.00000 
2003 STBC 0.00 1441 0.00000 
2006 EML 1.15 103.485 0.01111 
2007 PMFG 0.02 68.671 0.00035 
2003 ORBT 0.88 13.193 0.06685 
2006 WBCO 0.00 794.545 0.00000 
2006 ALOT 4.05 49.647 0.08152 
2005 DORM 1.50 212.156 0.00707 
2012 DGAS 0.00 182.895 0.00000 
2004 METR 0.00 1277.367 0.00000 
2012 IHC 0.00 1262.308 0.00000 
2005 HRG 0.00 294.354 0.00000 
2007 FLIC 0.00 1069.019 0.00000 
2005 PHX 0.00 61.242 0.00000 
2003 PULB 0.00 401.403 0.00000 
2004 PHX 0.00 54.186 0.00000 
2003 HBNC 0.00 757.071 0.00000 
2011 RGCO 0.00 125.549 0.00000 
2004 NSSC 4.52 56.672 0.07969 
2003 WIBC 0.00 983.264 0.00000 
2006 LWAY 0.00 32.999 0.00000 
2006 INMD 0.00 75.522 0.00000 
2005 METR 0.00 1641.121 0.00000 
2006 MSL 0.00 805.022 0.00000 
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2003 MFLR 0.00 203.105 0.00000 
2004 FSBK 0.00 721.231 0.00000 
2003 SNBC 0.00 2599.487 0.00000 
2003 ALTV 0.00 59.733 0.00000 
2004 STBC 0.00 1437.291 0.00000 
2003 WNNB 0.00 827.283 0.00000 
2006 RVSB 0.00 763.847 0.00000 
2006 EGBN 0.00 773.451 0.00000 
2003 NOVB 0.00 677.693 0.00000 
2003 VCBI 0.00 881.124 0.00000 
2004 ESCA 2.95 135.099 0.02181 
2004 NADX 0.00 81.831 0.00000 
2004 GBTB 0.00 1274.136 0.00000 
2003 BMTC 0.00 604.848 0.00000 
2004 RBCAA 0.00 2498.922 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2003 ROYL 0.00 35.671 0.00000 
2006 ODC 2.43 139.547 0.01741 
2004 FARM 0.00 317.871 0.00000 
2004 MSFG 0.00 1549.379 0.00000 
2006 FSBK 0.00 910.548 0.00000 
2010 PATR 0.00 257.712 0.00000 
2004 SJW 0.00 552.152 0.00000 
2004 MSFG 0.00 1549.379 0.00000 
2005 FOOT 0.00 798.706 0.00000 
2004 IHC 0.00 968.493 0.00000 
2004 FSRV 0.00 437.553 0.00000 
2004 CCNE 0.00 725.217 0.00000 
2004 OMTL 2.19 13.1 0.16695 
2004 GSBC 0.00 1846.239 0.00000 
2003 THFF 0.00 2223.057 0.00000 
2006 UUU 0.28 20.359 0.01365 
2012 IEP 172.00 24556 0.00700 
2006 GIII 0.00 138.317 0.00000 
2004 OSBC 0.00 2102.266 0.00000 
2005 CIA 0.00 661.889 0.00000 
2005 ABCB 0.00 1697.209 0.00000 
2004 GRC 0.00 165.344 0.00000 
2005 SBKCQ 0.00 1662.413 0.00000 
2005 SGDE 0.00 93.89 0.00000 
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2004 SBSI 0.00 1619.643 0.00000 
2009 ABCB 0.00 2423.97 0.00000 
2005 ORBT 0.97 29.152 0.03317 
2003 CSS 0.00 351.961 0.00000 
2005 INMD 0.00 66.633 0.00000 
2003 SBSI 0.00 1454.952 0.00000 
2005 WEYS 0.00 175.498 0.00000 
2007 VSEC 0.00 171.771 0.00000 
2005 VCO 0.00 598.68 0.00000 
2003 LABL 0.55 67.378 0.00822 
2003 MSEX 0.00 263.192 0.00000 
2004 FBNC 0.00 1638.913 0.00000 
2004 SBIT 0.00 989.117 0.00000 
2005 NSSC 4.25 59.907 0.07101 
2006 TWIN 2.28 236.172 0.00965 
2006 RBPAA 0.00 1356.311 0.00000 
2005 TMP 0.00 2106.87 0.00000 
2009 ABCB 0.00 2423.97 0.00000 
2003 CCBG 0.00 1846.502 0.00000 
2005 GHM 0.12 33.529 0.00352 
2006 SBSI 0.00 1890.976 0.00000 
2004 MCBC 0.00 1672.606 0.00000 
2005 LBAI 0.00 2206.033 0.00000 
2006 TESS 0.00 126.8 0.00000 
2005 RBCAA 0.00 2735.556 0.00000 
2012 SGA 0.00 197.33 0.00000 
2006 SJW 0.00 705.864 0.00000 
2004 BUSE 0.00 1964.441 0.00000 
2010 ABCB 0.00 2972.168 0.00000 
2003 CRRC 0.00 151.101 0.00000 
2012 IEP 172.00 24556 0.00700 
2004 SF 0.00 382.314 0.00000 
2003 FFIN 0.00 2092.571 0.00000 
2005 SNBC 0.00 3107.889 0.00000 
2003 OKSB 0.00 1580.725 0.00000 
2005 DSWL 0.00 136.976 0.00000 
2005 VCBI 0.00 1518.425 0.00000 
2003 WEYS 0.00 151.186 0.00000 
2004 CTBI 0.00 2709.094 0.00000 
2003 WSBA 0.00 1035.711 0.00000 
2004 TCBK 0.00 1625.974 0.00000 
2003 EVRT 0.00 706.163 0.00000 
2011 DEST 0.00 198.772 0.00000 
2011 IEP 156.00 25136 0.00621 
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2013 SHI 0.00 6051.97 0.00000 
2006 MSFG 0.00 2429.773 0.00000 
2003 WIBC 0.00 983.264 0.00000 
2006 LKFN 0.00 1836.706 0.00000 
2003 RBKV 0.00 867.293 0.00000 
2012 SNFCA 0.00 597.217 0.00000 
2012 HBNC 0.00 1847.677 0.00000 
2005 FSNMQ 0.00 2157.571 0.00000 
2006 MCBI 0.00 1268.434 0.00000 
2006 HRZB 0.00 1116.728 0.00000 
2003 MRTN 0.00 249.595 0.00000 
2005 FFIN 0.00 2733.827 0.00000 
2005 NICK 0.00 120.815 0.00000 
2004 HCSG 0.00 166.964 0.00000 
2006 EXPO 0.00 161.216 0.00000 
2005 CRRC 0.00 196.965 0.00000 
2013 KYO 0.00 24244.4 0.00000 
2013 CSWC 0.00 667.672 0.00000 
2003 HTHR 0.00 2674.003 0.00000 
2013 CRVL 0.00 182.382 0.00000 
2012 IEP 172.00 24556 0.00700 
2003 HRBT 0.00 2494.912 0.00000 
2006 MCBC 0.00 2074.816 0.00000 
2006 MCBC 0.00 2074.816 0.00000 
2006 MCBC 0.00 2074.816 0.00000 
2006 MCBC 0.00 2074.816 0.00000 
2003 DIOD 1.47 123.795 0.01189 
2003 CVBF 0.00 3854.349 0.00000 
2006 BANF 0.00 3418.574 0.00000 
2010 TMP 0.00 3260.343 0.00000 
2005 JJSF 0.37 305.924 0.00119 
2012 HMST 0.00 2631.23 0.00000 
2004 FELE 6.00 333.473 0.01799 
2005 CRMT 0.00 143.668 0.00000 
2004 IBOC 0.00 9917.951 0.00000 
2004 RBA 0.00 442.409 0.00000 
2007 TPL 0.00 32.657 0.00000 
2003 OFG 0.00 3039.468 0.00000 
2007 GRC 0.00 211.534 0.00000 
2004 RAVN 1.30 79.508 0.01635 
2005 FTBK 0.00 2637.005 0.00000 
2004 VCBI 0.00 1139.353 0.00000 
2012 VHI 20.00 3170.5 0.00631 
2003 ONB 0.00 9353.896 0.00000 
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2005 STLY 0.00 190.488 0.00000 
2005 YZC 0.00 2633.695 0.00000 
2004 NPBC 0.00 4478.793 0.00000 
2005 NPBC 0.00 4600.609 0.00000 
2003 BOKF 0.00 13581.74 0.00000 
2003 IBOC 0.00 6578.31 0.00000 
2003 CELL 0.00 444.69 0.00000 
2011 GRC 0.00 298.7 0.00000 
2004 HBHC 0.00 4664.726 0.00000 
2004 MOV 0.00 390.967 0.00000 
2003 MBFI 0.00 4355.093 0.00000 
2006 FRGBQ 0.00 2074.636 0.00000 
2005 PAR 6.27 125.149 0.05010 
2005 CVBF 0.00 5422.971 0.00000 
2003 MRTN 0.00 249.595 0.00000 
2007 LABL 1.93 107.081 0.01798 
2004 WST 6.30 658.7 0.00956 
2012 CMN 6.65 434.812 0.01529 
2013 GRC 0.00 355.638 0.00000 
2005 MRTN 0.00 349.733 0.00000 
2005 RMCF 0.00 19.248 0.00000 
2004 ENZ 8.31 110.334 0.07533 
2003 UCAP 0.06 189.714 0.00031 
2005 SJI 0.00 1436.146 0.00000 
2005 ENB 0.00 17210.9 0.00000 
2006 SRCE 0.00 3807.315 0.00000 
2005 IBOC 0.00 10391.85 0.00000 
2004 VLY 0.00 10763.39 0.00000 
2004 UFCS 0.00 2570.387 0.00000 
2006 CASS 0.00 858.471 0.00000 
2004 PRK 0.00 5412.584 0.00000 
2003 FNB 0.00 8308.31 0.00000 
2010 TR 0.00 860.383 0.00000 
2006 VCBI 0.00 1949.082 0.00000 
2005 WWD 40.06 705.466 0.05678 
2004 ONB 0.00 8898.304 0.00000 
2013 MRTN 0.00 525.802 0.00000 
2004 CBU 0.00 4393.831 0.00000 
2007 TWIN 2.02 267.184 0.00758 
2004 COLB 0.00 2177.55 0.00000 
2012 DORM 8.60 406.309 0.02117 
2004 SKT 0.00 936.378 0.00000 
2012 SCVL 0.00 386.562 0.00000 
2003 TRBS 0.00 4217.936 0.00000 
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2003 MTRX 0.00 202.939 0.00000 
2004 PVA 0.00 783.335 0.00000 
2006 NPBC 0.00 5452.288 0.00000 
2004 TIE 2.80 665.549 0.00421 
2004 ODFL 0.00 509.367 0.00000 
2005 TR 0.00 813.696 0.00000 
2008 PMFG 0.05 166.736 0.00032 
2003 SCHN 0.00 487.894 0.00000 
2008 NJR 0.00 2625.392 0.00000 
2004 CVBF 0.00 4511.011 0.00000 
2006 CTBK 0.00 1077.689 0.00000 
2012 SCL 25.13 985.478 0.02550 
2005 QSII 6.14 99.442 0.06173 
2005 MOG.A 29.73 1303.327 0.02281 
2005 ROL 0.00 439.637 0.00000 
2004 ROCK 0.00 957.701 0.00000 
2003 FBC 0.00 10570.19 0.00000 
2003 SNN 0.00 2220.794 0.00000 
2009 NEOG 3.64 142.176 0.02560 
2004 OFG 0.00 3725.695 0.00000 
2005 VIVO 4.36 110.569 0.03941 
2012 CCU 0.00 2772.276 0.00000 
2010 HEI 19.70 781.643 0.02520 
2006 FCFS 0.00 233.842 0.00000 
2004 PVTB 0.00 2535.817 0.00000 
2008 EBIX 7.61 141.167 0.05390 
2011 FFIN 0.00 4120.531 0.00000 
2005 RES 0.00 311.785 0.00000 
2004 CBSH 0.00 14250.37 0.00000 
2006 CRVL 0.00 100.098 0.00000 
2007 ROL 0.00 475.228 0.00000 
2005 RES 0.00 311.785 0.00000 
2009 VGR 3.99 735.542 0.00542 
2004 SSD 4.06 545.137 0.00745 
2005 ARLP 0.00 532.687 0.00000 
2005 SLGN 0.00 1530.62 0.00000 
2003 HIBB 0.00 129.58 0.00000 
2004 WIBC 0.00 1265.641 0.00000 
2005 CELL 0.00 487.824 0.00000 
2004 ANSS 23.79 239.646 0.09928 
2005 CHE 0.00 835.085 0.00000 
2004 HFC 0.00 982.713 0.00000 
2004 CACH 0.00 132.028 0.00000 
2006 UMBF 0.00 8917.765 0.00000 
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2005 STSA 0.00 7558.928 0.00000 
2003 ODFL 0.00 434.559 0.00000 
2006 SBIB 0.00 4117.559 0.00000 
2006 FTBK 0.00 3238.464 0.00000 
2004 CATY 0.00 6098.005 0.00000 
2006 CBSH 0.00 15230.35 0.00000 
2004 GWR 0.00 677.251 0.00000 
2004 SAFM 0.00 375.007 0.00000 
2013 VGR 0.00 1260.159 0.00000 
2010 HCSG 0.00 277.934 0.00000 
2006 MINI 0.00 900.03 0.00000 
2005 CBSH 0.00 13885.55 0.00000 
2013 WBK 0.00 650766.5 0.00000 
2005 ETP 0.00 4426.906 0.00000 
2004 BRC 18.87 694.33 0.02718 
2013 PZZA 0.00 464.291 0.00000 
2006 CW 39.68 1592.156 0.02492 
2007 CBSH 0.00 16204.83 0.00000 
2006 SCSC 0.00 613.219 0.00000 
2006 TNC 19.35 354.25 0.05463 
2005 INT 0.00 1014.001 0.00000 
2004 PNY 0.00 2335.877 0.00000 
2011 MMSI 15.34 447.017 0.03431 
2004 AIT 0.00 596.841 0.00000 
2008 TR 0.00 812.092 0.00000 
2007 NPBC 0.00 5824.421 0.00000 
2005 CLC 7.95 675.272 0.01177 
2013 NEOG 6.64 290.558 0.02284 
2011 CWT 0.00 1854.587 0.00000 
2012 MTX 19.33 1211.189 0.01596 
2004 DCOM 0.00 3377.266 0.00000 
2006 UIL 0.00 1631.493 0.00000 
2006 SPAR 9.43 190.648 0.04947 
2004 CNT 0.00 1598.491 0.00000 
2007 VIVO 4.80 132.698 0.03616 
2010 ROL 0.00 619.014 0.00000 
2003 MMSI 4.01 107.301 0.03735 
2004 PNM 0.00 3487.635 0.00000 
2006 DAKT 10.50 199.231 0.05270 
2008 IPAR 0.00 425.137 0.00000 
2003 CBSH 0.00 14287.16 0.00000 
2006 VLY 0.00 12395.03 0.00000 
2005 MCRI 0.00 117.67 0.00000 
2004 FCFS 0.00 160.939 0.00000 
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2004 TRBS 0.00 5839.347 0.00000 
2004 IMGC 12.49 284.935 0.04383 
2004 HIBB 0.00 168.562 0.00000 
2005 GIL 0.00 597.516 0.00000 
2005 FWRD 0.00 212.6 0.00000 
2003 ZQK 0.00 707.97 0.00000 
2013 FELE 9.90 1051.873 0.00941 
2006 BWS 0.00 1027.293 0.00000 
2005 ODFL 0.00 641.648 0.00000 
2007 SIGI 0.00 5001.992 0.00000 
2010 BRLI 0.00 244.131 0.00000 
2004 O 0.00 1442.315 0.00000 
2012 VGR 0.00 1086.731 0.00000 
2006 RY 0.00 536780 0.00000 
2004 HNP 0.00 8793.557 0.00000 
2005 CHH 0.00 265.1 0.00000 
2011 HEI 22.70 941.069 0.02412 
2006 SHOO 0.00 251.392 0.00000 
2011 SFUN 6.10 580.371 0.01051 
2005 BPO 0.00 9513 0.00000 
2005 VAL 75.88 2761.163 0.02748 
2006 CGI 0.00 190.066 0.00000 
2003 TEF 0.00 78196.13 0.00000 
2006 GWR 0.00 1141.064 0.00000 
2003 TTC 0.00 927.432 0.00000 
2005 HITK 3.82 81.612 0.04681 
2003 RYN 8.60 1838.68 0.00468 
2004 HTLD 0.00 517.012 0.00000 
2005 CRR 3.42 355.796 0.00961 
2004 WRI 0.00 3470.318 0.00000 
2003 MDU 0.00 3380.592 0.00000 
2012 BTH 0.00 434.923 0.00000 
2005 WTR 0.00 2626.725 0.00000 
2004 UNFI 0.00 508.767 0.00000 
2004 NATI 70.90 582.415 0.12173 
2007 NVO 0.00 9350.586 0.00000 
2006 RCI 0.00 14105 0.00000 
2004 LCAV 0.00 129.577 0.00000 
2005 TTI 1.50 726.85 0.00206 
2006 AIT 0.00 730.671 0.00000 
2005 CTHR 0.01 63.538 0.00022 
2003 OXM 0.00 494.365 0.00000 
2012 GRFS 0.00 7420.387 0.00000 
2005 IIVI 4.97 252.678 0.01965 
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2011 GRFS 0.00 7534.353 0.00000 
2005 ESE 12.20 428.72 0.02846 
2003 ATU 3.10 361.653 0.00857 
2004 CEC 0.00 612.017 0.00000 
2006 HUBG 0.00 484.548 0.00000 
2005 HIBB 0.00 202.105 0.00000 
2008 SF 0.00 1558.145 0.00000 
2003 MDC 0.00 1969.8 0.00000 
2004 EWBC 0.00 6028.88 0.00000 
2004 HCP 0.00 3102.634 0.00000 
2004 MOG.A 30.50 1124.928 0.02711 
2004 RJF 0.00 7621.846 0.00000 
2005 SNHY 0.00 73.561 0.00000 
2005 DIOD 3.42 289.515 0.01182 
2006 GISX 0.00 884.657 0.00000 
2006 IMO 68.00 16141 0.00421 
2005 PBCT 0.00 10932.5 0.00000 
2004 LUK 0.00 4800.403 0.00000 
2005 TALX 5.29 246.919 0.02143 
2005 CBI 4.14 1377.819 0.00301 
2005 TEF 0.00 86652.38 0.00000 
2004 CHD 26.90 1877.998 0.01432 
2004 BPOP 0.00 44401.58 0.00000 
2003 BF.B 0.00 2264 0.00000 
2013 HEI 30.40 1533.015 0.01983 
2004 MSCC 19.37 232.998 0.08313 
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